By Daniel D. Hutto
Hutto and Myin advertise the reason for a notably enactive, embodied method of cognition which holds that a few forms of minds - simple minds - are neither most sensible defined by means of methods related to the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the commonly recommended thesis that cognition constantly and all over the place comprises content material. The authors guard the counter-thesis that there may be intentionality and exceptional event with out content material, and show the benefits of their method for puzzling over scaffolded minds and consciousness. Read more...
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Additional info for Radicalizing enactivism : basic minds without content
At the same time, they don’t break faith with unrestricted CIC. , bodily formats) of content endorse only Conservative Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (CEC). CEC does not break faith with unrestricted CIC. Though such conservative renderings are possible, they obviously go against the spirit of an enactivism that is serious about its rejection of content and representation. REC presses for the strongest reading of the Embodiment Thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood in terms of, concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less.
And it surely follows that, despite its great emphasis on experience being grounded in knowledge, this would not make Sensorimotor Enactivism a properly intellectualist proposal that buys into CIC. But Sensorimotor Enactivism is surely committed to intellectualism in another way: through its attachment to the idea that perceptual experience is inherently contentful. Noë avers that “perceptual experience presents things as being thus and such” and that “it has content” (2004, p. 189). ” (p. 183) Accordingly, “to see one must have visual impressions that one understands” (p.
1995, p. 31, emphases added) Although we agree with Dretske that there are different ways of experiencing the same thing, we identify these ways of experiencing with specific aspectual ways of responding, rather than with aspectual representations—with contents, as Dretske does. Why on earth would anyone contemplate making such a foundational adjustment to Dretske’s theory? We will argue in chapter 4 that defenders of CIC face an intractable problem, which we will call the Hard Problem of Content.